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How do teacher incentives affect student achievement? We contribute to this question by 
examining the effects of the recent introduction of teacher performance-related pay and 
tournaments in Portugal's public schools. Specifically, we draw on matched student-school 
panel data covering the population of secondary school national exams over seven years. 
We then conduct a difference-in-differences analysis based on two complementary control 
groups: public schools in two autonomous regions that were exposed to lighter versions of 
the reform than in the rest of the country; and private schools, which are also subject to the 
same national exams but whose teachers were not affected by the reform. Our results 
consistently indicate that the increased focus on individual teacher performance caused a 
significant decline in student achievement, particularly in terms of national exams. The triple-
difference results also document a significant increase in grade inflation. 
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Recent research has emphasized the importance of teachers in terms of students' achievement
(Rivkin et al. 2005, Rocko 2004, Martins & Walker 2006). However, this line of enquiry
has also shown that it is particularly dicult to explain dierences in teacher quality, at
least when using teacher characteristics available for research analysis. These results have
generated increased interest in the study of mechanisms that may raise achievement through
teachers, including increasing teacher training, improving teachers' pay or stregthening teacher
incentives (Lazear 2003). This paper addresses the latter policy option.
In fact, teacher incentives, either individual or collective, may improve student achieve-
ment if they succeed in aligning the public or even social goals with the goals of the teacher.
In this case, a combination of incentive and composition eects will increase student per-
formance (Lazear 2000, 2003). However, an approach in which reward is based on outputs
can also be fraught with diculties, which may explain the popularity of simpler input-based
rewards (Kane & Staiger 2002). For instance, setting specic measurable outputs may lead
to potentially dysfunctional behaviour such as teaching to test. Moreover, while individ-
ual incentives may disrupt collaborative work (Martins 2008), collective incentives may also
generate free riding and, in the end, little incentive eect. Finally, the extra risk in pay in
output-based compensation will need to be compensated by higher wages, especially when
the output is determined by many other variables than the agent's eort, as in the case of
education production.
Although the theoretical analysis on the eects of teacher incentives is ambiguous, the
empirical literature in this area is particularly thin. We know of only three studies that
explore randomized or quasi-natural experiments to address the causal relationship between
teacher incentives and student achievement - Lavy (2002), Glewwe et al. (2003) and Lavy
(forthcoming). Furthermore, the results of these three papers are not entirely consistent:
the two studies based on Israel (Lavy 2002, forthcoming) are supportive of the potential of
collective and individual teacher incentives, while the randomized experiment based on Kenya
(Glewwe et al. 2003) is not.1
In this paper, we add to this small literature by examining the eects of the recent intro-
1See also Eberts et al. (2002) for a case study of a US county, Figlio & Kenny (2007) for a study of the
US based on cross-sectional data and Atkinson et al. (forthcoming) for a recent analysis of the introduction of
performance-related pay for teachers in England.
2duction of individual teacher incentives in Portugal's public-sector schools. The main aspects
of this reform, described in more detail in Section 2, are the breaking up of the until then
single pay scale for teachers into two; and the performance-related criteria set for progres-
sion between the two pay scales. This established a clear contrast in the incentives faced
by public-school teachers as until then salaries essentially only varied with tenure. More-
over, the criterion for teacher progression which received by far most attention, in the media
and amongst teachers, was the (internal and external) results of the students taught by each
teacher. Another much-debated criterion was the feedback from the students' parents about
the teacher: if positive, the chances of progression would increase. In addition, all progres-
sions between the two pay scales were also conditional on not exceeding a given number of
vacancies per school, determined for all schools every two years by the Education Department.
Finally, those teachers that did particularly well along the progression criteria and also met
centrally-determined quotas would receive a one-o nancial award. These and other aspects
of the reform are broadly consistent with the characteristics of tournaments, as in Lazear &
Rosen (1981).
We study the eects of these reforms in terms of students' school-level and national-
exam results. Specically, we draw on freely-available matched student-school data covering
the population of secondary school students that sat national exams from 2002 to 2008 in
Portugal. We then conduct a dierence-in-dierences analysis (Meyer 1995) based on two
complementary control groups. In the rst control group, we consider public schools in the
Azores and Madeira. These are two autonomous regions of Portugal that were exposed to
lighter versions of the reform than the rest of the country, as their pay scale remained un-
changed and progression was less restricted. In the second control group, we consider private
schools. These schools are again subject to the same national exams as the treatment group
but whose teachers were not aected by the reform, as pay and other incentives are set freely
by each private school.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the eects of teacher incentives in dierent
ways. First, this is the rst paper in this literature that examines a reform that was applied
across a country (rather than in a pilot study) and that conducts the analysis drawing on
representative (population) data. In this way, we are able to address most issues of external
validity that typically receive little attention in the literature. More generally, our results
3contrast with the approach common in the empirical literature on incentives which typically
faces severe data constraints and therefore tends to be based on case-studies of individual
organisations (Lazear 2000, Bandiera et al. 2005).
Our population data also contrast with the case of the three papers mentioned above
that draw on randomized or quasi-experimental studies (Lavy 2002, Glewwe et al. 2003, Lavy
forthcoming). In the words of Meyer (1995), "[a] weakness of natural experiments is that
their results may not be generalizable beyond the group of individuals or rms or the setting
used in the study." (page 159). Indeed, these papers do not claim to present representative
evidence of the countries examined there as their research design generates ATT (average
treatment on the treated) eects instead. Moreover, the fact that we are using ocial data
throught the period analysed improves the quality of our ndings in terms of measurement
error bias.
A second important aspect of our study is that as the assignment of schools to treatment
is not random in our analysis, we conduct considerable robustness analysis, on top of our
consideration of two complementary control groups. For instance, our analysis of a long
period of up to ve years before the reform allows us to assess the common trends hypothesis
in some detail. Furthermore, we also consider a number of dierent specications that control
for dierent sets of variables, including school and school-exam xed eects, and we also
examine dierent data subsets and dierent aggregation levels.
Finally, we pay particular attention to the potential for grade in
ation. This may result
from the fact that the progression criteria are aected by student results that are determined
at least in part by teachers themselves (see Jacob & Levitt (2003) for an extreme example
of grade in
ation). As we have individual student data on both school- and national-level
results, we can examine grade in
ation from a triple-dierences perspective by considering,
for each student-module pair, the dierence between the internal and external mark. These
results complement our evidence on the eects of the reform separately in terms of internal
and external grades.
Overall, our results consistently indicate that the increased focus on individual teacher
performance caused a sizable and statistically signicant decline in student achievement. This
decline in achievement is also much more pronounced in the case of national exams with an
eect of up to 40% of a standard deviation. As in the dierent eects in terms of internal
4and external results, our triple-dierence evidence also documents a signicant increase of
grade in
ation. In addition, in support of a causal interpretation of our results, we also nd
that in almost all specications and dependent variables there are no signicant dierences
between the treatment and control groups over time before the introduction of merit-pay.
Finally, the inclusion of dierent control variables or the consideration of dierent subsets of
the data makes only very minor dierences to the size of our estimates, as would be the case
if assignment to treatment were random.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the main characteristics of
the education reform studied in the paper and discusses some of its theoretical implications.
Section 3 presents the data used in the paper, a matched school-student panel data set; Section
4 describes the main results, while Section 5 presents the robustness analysis. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
2 Background
A new government that came into oce in 2005 decided to respond to the evidence of relatively
poor performance levels in the Portuguese education system (OECD 2001). Indeed, when
measured in terms of international comparisons such as the OECD's PISA tests, students in
Portugal do not fare well. This is particularly true when taking into account the relatively
high expenditure levels in education in the country, of which relatively high average teacher
salaries are an important component.
The main aspect of the education reform was the breaking up of the until then single
pay scale for teachers into two separate scales. This and other aspects of the reform became
law in January 2007, after having been subject to public discussion for several months and
approved by the government in November 2006. The breakup of the pay scale marked an
important contrast with the period before the 2006/07 school year as teachers were no longer
ensured of virtually automatic, tenure-related progression from the bottom to the top of the
scale during their careers. In particular, the gap between the last point in the lower scale and
the rst point of the higher scale was potentially particularly large, at about 25%, from about
￿2,000 to about ￿2,500 per month (gross). On the other hand, those teachers in the higher
pay scale had a dierent job title and were supposed to play a special role in management
and pedagogical tasks in their schools.
5Another key aspect of the reform is that the new policy conditioned progression from the
lower to the upper pay scale on a number of aspects of individual teacher performance. These
broadly measurable criteria were virtually inexistent until them. One such criterion for teacher
progression, which received by far most media attention, was the results of the students taught
by each teacher. Another criterion that also received considerable attention was the feedback
from the students' parents about the teacher. The remaining criteria included the teacher's
attendance record, attendance at training sessions, management and pedagogical duties, and
involvement in research projects.
According to the law, these criteria for progression were to be assessed at each school,
by those teachers in the higher pay scale. Moreover, detailed assessment sheets were made
available by the Education Department and were supposed to be used in the process of
gathering information regarding the above-mentioned criteria.2 However, if the teacher did
well along these criteria, progression between the two pay scales was also conditional on a
given number of vacancies per school, determined centrally every two years by the Education
Department as a function of the number of students in the school.
Finally, those teachers that did particularly well along the progression criteria and met
centrally-determined quotas would also receive a one-o nancial award. The specic amount
of this award was not made public when the rst law was released (January 2007) but recent
reports as of January 2009 indicate that the annual award can amount to around one monthly
salary.
On the political economy side, the reform generated considerable heated debate and oppo-
sition from teachers and their unions, including two national strikes. The extensive bargaining
between government and unions that ensued created some confusion about the ultimate format
of the incentive system, which is not yet absolutely clear at the time of writing.
However, several reports from dierent sources indicate that teachers acknowledged the
change in incentives and adapted their behaviour in some way. Additionally, teachers without
tenure and teachers with intermediate levels of tenure have already been assessed for the
purpose of progression in the terms of new law. Their assessment includes the period covered
by our data (see Section 3). New assessment rounds (which are to take place every two years)
2Teachers also complained that the administrative burden involved in the teacher assessment process was
considerable. The time spent handling the formal aspects of applying for progression may also have reduced
the eort that teachers put into teaching activities.
6are being prepared at the moment and the period of time that will be taken into account for
the purpose of that assessment again includes our data.
From the above, we conclude that the reform under study here involves a stark contrast
in terms of teacher assessment and incentives. In particular, the new assessment framework
introduces several aspects which can be characterised not only as performance-related pay but
also more specically as tournaments (Lazear & Rosen 1981). In this context, and turning to
a theoretical discussion of the predicted eects of this reform, there are dierent arguments
to take into account. On the one hand, the greater weight placed on performance indicators
will presumably induce teachers to focus their eort on those criteria highlighted in the law.
This is expected to increase student achievement, which is proxied by national exams and
school-level results in our study.
On the other hand, tournaments are known to be potentially disruptive in terms of the
collaborative work amongst agents involved in a competition (see Martins (2008) and the
references therein). Moreover, collaborative work may be particularly important in the edu-
cation context. Fairness concerns may come to the fore and undermine teacher morale (Fehr
& Schmidt 1999). Second, there will be extra risk in pay which presumably needs to be com-
pensated by higher wages. However, this was not the case, as pay scales were not improved.
Adjustment may thus have taken place via worker turnover and worker composition, again
with a potentially detrimental eect upon student achievement.
Finally, setting broadly measurable outputs may lead to dysfunctional behaviour such as
teaching to test or engaging in grade in
ation. In the specic case of the secondary schools
considered here, it is worthwhile to point out that the nal grade of each student results
from a weighted average of the internal and external marks, the weights being 70% and 30%,
respectively. Because of these weights and also because teachers have direct control of internal
marks, evidence of grade in
ation, if any, is more likely to be observed in terms of internal
marks.
One important nal aspect to refer in terms of the education reform studied here is that
it only applied to a smaller extent in the cases of the two autonomous regions in Portugal,
the Azores and Madeira. Indeed, these two regions have special legislative powers in some
domains, including education, and they have decided not to follow the education reform in
7the mainland.3 Specically, the two regions also introduced greater emphasis on assessment
of a teacher's performance, under broadly the same criteria as in the mainland, although less
so in the case of Madeira. However, one important dierence that applied to both Azores and
Madeira is that they did not break up their pay scale. These dierences in the intensity of
the treatment are exploited in our empirical analysis.
3 Data
Our data cover the population of high-school national exams in Portugal over seven school
years, from 2001/02 to 2007/08. The data are made available by the National Exams Com-
mittee (JNE, Jur  Nacional de Exames), an agency of the Ministry of Education which is
responsible for all matters regarding national exams carried out in the country. These na-
tional exams, studied in this paper, are required for the award of the high-school diploma and
also for university entry (European Commission 2007).
The data also include information about the internal grades obtained by students in each
module (a specic discipline of study, such as Portuguese or Maths) from their schools, which
are based on test results and other criteria adopted by each school and teacher. There is also
information about the students' nal result in each module, after taking into account each
student's internal and national-exam grades. Internal grades are censored below 10, the pass
level, in a scale of 0 to 20, in which case the student cannot sit the national exam, except in
special circumstances. All data used in the paper are freely available from the JNE website.4
The data do not include any individual student identier; instead, each observation con-
cerns a student-module-school-year combination. Typically, there will be several observations
for each student but it will not be possible to match them. However, all schools and all mod-
ules are identied by name and through unique time-invariant codes. Importantly, there is
also information on the school's location at the concelho level, resulting in about 400 dierent
geographical areas, and the school's public or private status. Each student-module-school-
year combination is also characterised in terms of several variables, namely if the exam is a
3The relevant legal documents are Law (Decreto-Leis) 17/2007, of January 19th and 200/2007, of May
22nd, and Regional Laws (Decretos Legislativos Regionais) 28/2006/A, of August 8th; 21/2007/A, of August
30th; and 6/2008/M, of February 25th.
4Link: http://sitio.dgidc.min-edu.pt/JNE/Paginas/estatistica.aspx (in Portuguese). The
data were originally released openly so that the media could compile school rankings. As far as we know, the
data have never been used for other purposes until now.
8resit (either because the student failed before or because the student wants to improve their
grade), if the student is applying for admission to university, and if the student is sitting the
exam but is not enrolled in the school. The data also include the student's gender and age,
but only for the last three years (2005/06-2007/08); and the student's school year when taking
the module (typically 12th, which is the last in secondary education in Portugal, but also the
11th, as some modules are subject to national exams at that stage).
We create our main sample of analysis by drawing on all student-exam pairs that meet the
following ve conditions: a rst sit in the rst call of a student that is applying to university
and is also enrolled in the module of the exam in the school where they are sitting the exam;
only schools that are present in the data in all seven years. These criteria are similar to
those adopted by most media when compiling school rankings. Our criteria are also imposed
in order to ensure that the eect in terms of internal and external grades are based on the
same sample and thus are comparable. The resulting 1,411,246 observations are distributed
across 563 schools, of which 469 are public schools and subject to the reforms described in
the previous section.5
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics based on the student-exam level data. We
nd that the average internal mark is 13.3 while the exam mark is 10.6.6 These statistics
are evidence of dierent standards between school and national exams and, perhaps, also of
grade in
ation in schools. Indeed, the mean of the dierence between the internal and the
external marks, 2.6, is not only positive but also considerably large when compared to the
average mark of the internal exam. We also nd that about 11% of the exams pertain to
private schools and about 5% are from schools in the Azores and Madeira regions. Moreover,
there is a downward trend in the number of exams in the period covered, which is consistent
with the declining number of students enrolled in secondary school as indicated by national
statistics. The exception to the trend is 2006, when new exams were introduced while some
of the older exams were still sat by students.
Table 2 presents additional descriptive statistics, but referring to the school-level data. Of
5The original size of the data is 3,092,507. 28.68% of these observations refer to second calls; 31.22% are not
enrolled in the school; 7.73% are not applying for university admission; and 26.98% are resitting the exam. Of
course, these exclusion categories overlap for many observations. Only one school is not present in the data in
all years, a result that highlights the stability of the education sector in Portugal. No school switches between
public and private status. Moreover, extensive robustness analysis was conducted and the results presented
below in Section 4 are not sensitive to dierent sample denitions as discussed in Section 5.
6The words grade and mark are used interchangeably here. They both refer to the result of a student,
either at the school level or in national exams, and are expressed in the 0-20 scale.
9interest for the interpretation of the magnitude of our main results, the standard deviations of
the logarithms of the internal and external exams are 0.05 and 0.15, respectively. Moreover,
the standard deviation of the dierence between the internal and external result is 1.028. We
also nd that, on average, there are 417 exams per year per school.
4 Results
As mentioned before, we estimate the eects of the introduction of performance-related pay
from dierence-in-dierences models of student grade equations. Our identication assump-
tion is that there is no eect specic to public schools (in the continent) from the 2006/07
school year other than the education reform. Specically, in the case of our rst control group,
schools located in Azores and Madeira, we estimate specications as follows:
yijt = 0 + 1Continentj + 2Aftert + 3Continentj  Aftert + uijt: (1)
In most cases, yijt denotes the logarithm of the grade (internal or external) of the student-
exam pair i in school j in year t. In two alternative specications, the dependent variable
is instead a measure of grade in
ation, namely the dierence between the internal and the
external grade of the same student-exam pair (a triple dierences specication) or a dummy
variable taking value one if the internal grade exceeds the external grade.
We do not consider the logarithm of the dierences between the internal and external
grades in order to keep in our analysis those cases of `grade de
ation', when the external
grade is less than the internal grade. Our analysis of dierent nonlinear functions of the
dependent variable also serves a useful robustness purpose. Indeed, if there are other relevant
interaction eects that break down the identication assumption, our qualitative results are
less likely to hold across dierent dependent variables. More important, the triple-dierence
specication is based on a weaker identifying assumption. It simply requires that there is no
contemporaneous shock that aects the relative outcomes of the treatment group in the same
years as the education reform.
In all cases, Continentj is a dummy variable with value one if school j is located in
mainland, continental Portugal (henceforth referred to as continent): this variable will pick
up permanent dierences in terms of the dependent variable between those schools located in
10the continent and those located in Azores or Madeira. Aftert is another dummy variable, with
value one if year t is 2007 (i.e. school year 2006-2007) or later, the period when the reforms
were more intense, as discussed in Section 2: this variable will pick up across-the-board
dierences between the period before the intervention and the period after the intervention
(the introduction of performance-related pay).
Finally, Continentj  Aftert is the product of the two previous dummy variable and its
parameter, 3, is the object of interest in this paper. Its estimate will pick up the eect of the
education reforms upon student achievement or grade in
ation, i.e. any additional dierence
between the two types of schools that emerges after the intervention.
From the benchmark specication in equation 1, we consider three extended versions with
dierent additional controls. The rst version includes controls for school size (the total
number of exams sat in each year) and regions (20 xed eects). The second specication
includes school size and school xed eects (as the latter are perfectly collinear with the
regions xed eects, these region xed eects are dropped from the analysis). Finally, the
third additional specication includes school size and school-exam xed eects.7 Importantly,
all models are estimated with robust standard errors, allowing for clustering at the school
level.
The rst set of results, based on internal grades, are presented in Table 3. These results
draw on the student-level data described in Table 1, except that private schools are dropped.
Across all four specications, we nd negative point estimates, indicating that the levels of
achievement of public schools in the continent fall with respect to public schools in Azores
and Madeira. The magnitude of the estimates is very similar across the specications, ranging
from -.008 to -.01, or about one fth of a standard deviation of the dependent variable across
all schools. On the other hand, the statistical signicance of the coecients is poor, as it does
not meet the 5% signicance level.
However, when we turn to Table 4, which presents similar specications but consider-
ing external grades instead, we nd much higher eects, ranging from -.04 to -.054. These
correspond to approximately one third of a standard deviation of the log of average grades
across schools. In addition, all estimates here are also signicant, even at the .1% level. The
7Because the structure of exams changes over the period, we focus on a subset of four of the most important
topics covered in these tests: Portuguese, Maths, Biology, and Physics/Chemistry. Each subset includes all
exams that include the topic above in their exam title.
11comparison of the two sets of results (internal and external) therefore indicates that while
national-exam results of public schools in the continent fall signicantly and by a meaning-
ful size with respect to the same change for public schools in the Azores and Madeira, the
equivalent eect for internal marks is much smaller and much less precise.8
The contrast between the internal and external results suggests that grade in
ation in the
public schools in the continent is a presumably unintended eect of the reform. Indeed, our
triple-dierence estimates - see Table 5 - indicate precisely that. We nd that the average
gap between internal and external marks increases by .217 to .246 (or about one quarter of a
standard deviation of average grade in
ation) in public schools in the continent with respect
to their counterparts in Azores and Madeira. In all cases the coecients are signicant, at
least at the 5% level. Similarly, we also nd evidence that the probability of grade in
ation
increases in the continent with respect to Azores and Madeira - see Table 6.
The fact that the latter estimates are relatively small (between .01 and .022, although
all signicant at the 5% level except in one case) indicates that the eects in terms of grade
in
ation were felt mostly along the intensive margin, i.e. increased in
ation in marks that
previously tended to exhibit in
ation, rather than the extensive margin. This is related to the
limited room for expansion along the extensive margin, as only 14% of the marks exhibited
`de
ation' and only 23% of the marks are the same at the internal and external level (here
dened as an absolute dierence of less than .5).
We now turn to our second and complementary control group: private schools. Although
it is well known that private schools tend to exhibit better results in terms of the academic
achievement of their students, our dierence-in-dierences approach will control at least for
permanent dierences between them and public schools. (See Neal (1997) for a study of
student achievement in Catholic private schools, which correspond to a large share of the
private schools in our data.)










3Publicj  Aftert + uijt; (2)
8We also nd, both in Table 3 and in Table 4, that the After coecients are always signicantly positive,
suggesting a trend towards higher marks.
12All variables take the same interpretation as before; and Publicj is a dummy variable with
value one if school j is a State school. 
0
3 is now the parameter of interest. All models in this
section are estimated with the full set of student-level data described in Table 1, except that
schools located in the Azores and Madeira islands (public or private) are dropped.
Table 7 presents the results for the internal grades. As in the case in which the public
schools in Azores and Madeira served as the control group, we nd again evidence that the
introduction of the individual teacher incentives had a detrimental eect on student achieve-
ment. However, in the present case, the coecients range from -.017 to -.022, or about twice
as much as in the equivalent specication under the rst control group. Moreover, the co-
ecients are now always statistically signicant, even at the .1% level. The increase in the
magnitude of the eects, to around 40% of a standard deviation, is also consistent with the in-
creased intensity of the treatment in public schools in the continent when compared to public
schools in Azores and Madeira, as discussed in Section 2.
These ndings are also consistent with the external grade results - see Table 8. There we
nd that achievement in public schools, when compared to private schools, falls by between
-.046 to -.065, and is again always signicant at the .1% level. The magnitude of these eects
corresponds to about one third of a standard deviation of external results.
Finally, the grade in
ation result, obtained from the stronger eects in external grades
when compared to internal grades is once again corroborated from the triple-dierence results.
In Table 9, we nd that grade in
ation increases by between .193 to .27 across the four
specications considered there, all of which are signicant at the 1% level. Similar results to
those of the rst control group are found for the grade in
ation probability too.
Overall, the results suggest strongly that the onset of individual teacher incentives led to a
decrease in student achievement and an increase of grade in
ation. As mentioned before, this
is consistent with incentives-related disruption in colaborative work in schools, once teachers
are facing tournaments with their colleagues. This is also consistent with teaching to the test
in terms of internal results, those which carry a greater weight in terms of the nal result of
the student in the module (70%). However, given the non-random nature of the intervention,
we conduct additional robustness in the next section, before reaching our conclusions.
135 Robustness
One important test of the strength of a causal interpretation of dierence-in-dierences esti-
mates concerns common trends. Indeed, if there are no interactions between treatment and
other variables, as assumed for identication purposes, one would expect parallel movement
between the treatment and control groups. We conduct this analysis here by considering more

exible versions of equations 1 and 2. Specically, we allow the dierence of the treatment
group with respect to the control group to vary during the period prior to the intervention.
If our earlier estimates are indeed capturing a causal eect, then we expect that there will be
no statistically signicant dierences between the two groups (control and treatment) until
the occurrence of the treatment.
Moreover, we also allow the eect of the education reform to vary over the After period.
This serves as another robustness test, as it allows us to investigate any cumulative eects of
the reform. In this context, the equation we estimate is as follows:







kContinentj I(yeart = k)+uijt:
(3)
All variables have the same meaning as before; and I() is the indicator function. The
coecients of interest are now the 
k (k=2003, ..., 2008), which will indicate any dierences
in the yearly eects of the treatment group with respect to the comparison year (2002). Again,
we also consider specications with region, school or school-exam xed eects.
Table 10 presents the results based on the internal grades as the dependent variable. We
nd that, across all specications, there are no dierences in trends between public schools
in Azores and Madeira and those in the continent. We also nd that there are signicant
treatment eects in 2007, but not in 2008. In terms of external results - Table 11 -, we nd
again no evidence of dierent trends between the two types of schools. On the other hand,
the signicant negative results of public schools in the continent are concentrated in 2008
(although the point estimates increase considerably from 2006 to 2007). These results are
also displayed in Figure 1.
The decomposition of the results on grade in
ation are again consistent with the earlier
ndings. Table 12 indicates no systematic dierences between the two types of schools until
2008, when grade in
ation eects jump in magnitude and become statistically signicant in
14all cases except one. Before that, in 2007, point estimates are already typically much higher
than before.
Overall, we regard these results are very supportive of our causal interpretation. Further-
more, the cumulative nature of the eects is also consistent with the cumulative nature of the
reform, in the sense that the cohorts that take their exams later (in 2008 rather than in 2007)
are also cohorts that have been exposed to the treatment for a longer period.
We also test the common trends assumption (and the cumulativeness of the eects) in














kPublicj  I(yeart = k) + uijt: (4)
Again we nd evidence of no statistically signicant dierences during the before period
for all three variables considered (internal and external grades and grade in
ation) and across
the four specications estimated for each variable - see Tables 13 and 14 (and Figure 2) for the
results on internal and external marks and Table 15 for the results on grade in
ation.9 Without
exception, all point estimates in 2008 are bigger (in absolute terms) than their counterparts
for 2007, although their dierences are typically not statistically signicant. However, we
regard this additional nding about the increase of the point estimates as further evidence
consistent with the cumulative eects of the reform.
We have also conducted a number of additional robustness tests. First, we considered
dierent subsets of our original data. Specically, we consider possible dierences from the
benchmark results alternatively in urban areas, in large schools or in core subjects. Second,
we extended the range of data examined from rst-sit results (which account for about 85%
of the total number of exams) to rst- and second-sits. Third, we extended the range of data
considered even further, considering also resit students and those not applying for university
entry. Fourth, we replicated our results using data collapsed into before and after periods, as
suggested in Bertrand et al. (2004). In all cases, the qualitative results across the dierent
specications were unchanged and only relatively minor dierences were found in terms of the
quantitative ndings. Finally, our early results based on the case of primary schools (Martins
9The only exception to this pattern is some evidence of lower external results and higher in
ation in 2004
and 2005, but only in two specications. Those point estimates are generally quite smaller than the 2007 or
2008 point estimates.
152009) also nds similar qualitative results as for secondary schools.10
6 Conclusions
There is great interest in understanding the potential of teacher incentives to improve student
achievement. This paper sheds light into this question by examining the recent introduction of
performance-related pay in Portugal's public schools. Our approach is based on a dierence-
in-dierences analysis drawing on two complementary control groups. These control groups
either were exposed to a lighter version of the intervention (the case of public schools in the
Azores and Madeira) or were not exposed at all (the case of private schools). All students in
all schools were administered the same national exams.
Our results consistently indicate that the increased focus on individual teacher perfor-
mance caused a signicant and sizable relative decline in student achievement, as measured
by national exams. However, the decline in achievement is less sizable when considering
school-level results, suggesting an increasing importance of grade in
ation. This result is also
supported by our triple-dierence evidence. Furthermore, we nd additional support for a
causal interpretation of our results from our analysis of common trends, robustness to dierent
control variables, dierent data subsets and dierent aggregation levels. The use of ocial
population data also ensures greater reliability in terms of the external validity of our results
and measurement bias.
Overall, our student achievement results are consistent with the potential for disruption
in collaborative work in schools created by tournaments for promotions and prizes. On the
other hand, the increase in grade in
ation can be explained by the emphasis placed by the
new promotion criteria on student results. While our results are negative in terms of the
value of the specic reform examined here, our ndings also indicate that teachers respond to
incentives in a predictable way. In this context, we believe that future research should move
from the question of whether performance-related pay has any eects to the narrower question
of which specic performance-related pay setups generate the best results for students.
10We also consider the eects in terms of the public vs private contrast within Azores and Madeira only.
The results are again very similar to our benchmark ndings. However they are less precise, as there is only
one private school in this subset. In addition, we also contrasted the percentage of students that applied for
university entry between the treatment and the control groups. Here we found some evidence of a greater per-
centage of public-school students applying for university. However, it is unclear if this results from composition
dierences across the two groups over time or if this is an eect itself of the grade in
ation documented before.
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20Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - All Exams
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Internal Exam 13.322 2.598 10 20
External Exam 10.66 3.992 0.1 20
Internal - External Exam 2.662 3.148 -10 18.9
Log Internal Exam 2.571 0.19 2.303 2.996
Log External Exam 2.276 0.47 -2.303 2.996
Public 0.888 0.315 0 1
Continent 0.949 0.221 0 1
No. Exams 651.440 390.932 1 3152
2003 0.166 0.372 0 1
2004 0.121 0.327 0 1
2005 0.135 0.342 0 1
2006 0.164 0.37 0 1
2007 0.112 0.316 0 1
2008 0.115 0.319 0 1
Notes: Author's calculations based on Jur  Nacional de Exames data. The
internal (external) exam refers to the mark obtained by each student in each
module by the school (national exam). `Public' and `Continent' are dummy
variables which are equal to one for students in public schools or schools located
in mainland Portugal, respectively. There are 1411246 observations in each
variable.
21Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - All Schools
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Internal Exam 13.055 0.687 10.333 16.356
External Exam 10.123 1.308 5.467 15.72
Internal - External Exam 2.932 1.028 -1.564 6.653
Log Internal Exam 2.55 0.05 2.334 2.777
Log External Exam 2.212 0.154 1.569 2.735
Public 0.833 0.373 0 1
Continent 0.945 0.228 0 1
No. Exams 417.287 313.339 1 3152
2003 0.143 0.35 0 1
2004 0.143 0.35 0 1
2005 0.143 0.35 0 1
2006 0.143 0.35 0 1
2007 0.143 0.35 0 1
2008 0.143 0.35 0 1
Notes: Author's calculations based on Jur  Nacional de Exames data. The inter-
nal (external) exam refers to the mark obtained by each student in each module by
the school (national exam). `Public' and `Continent' are dummy variables which are
equal to one for students in public schools or schools located in mainland Portugal,
respectively. There are 3941 observations in each variable.
22Table 3: Eects on internal grades - Islands control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After .012 .015 .010 .021
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Continent .003
(.006)
Continent-After -.009 -.008 -.008 -.010
(.007) (.007) (.005) (.006)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1047472 1047472 1047472 664637
R2 .0001 .004 .022 .052
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the school-level grade of each student in each exam in each year.
Dummy After is one for 2007 and 2008 only. Data used: 2002 to 2008, except for 2006. Columns 2-4
includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust standard errors,
allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
23Table 4: Eects on external grades - Islands control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After .033 .047 .028 .085
(.012) (.014) (.013) (.016)
Continent .114
(.019)
Continent-After -.040 -.042 -.042 -.054
(.013) (.015) (.013) (.016)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1046910 1046910 1046910 664215
R2 .003 .016 .045 .123
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the national exam grade of each student in each exam in each
year. Dummy After is one for 2007 and 2008 only. Data used: 2002 to 2008, except for 2006. Columns
2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust standard errors,
allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
24Table 5: Eects on grade in
ation - Islands control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After -.036 -.119 -.026 -.249
(.111) (.121) (.118) (.143)
Continent -.914
(.129)
Continent-After .217 .233 .244 .246
(.114) (.123) (.119) (.145)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1047472 1047472 1047472 664637
R2 .004 .02 .053 .162
Notes: Dependent variable is the dierence between the internal (school) grade and the external (national
exam) grade of each student in each exam in each year. Dummy After is one for 2007 and 2008 only. Data
used: 2002 to 2008, except for 2006. Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken in each
school in each year. Robust standard errors, allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels:
*: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
25Table 6: Eects on grade in
ation probability - Islands control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After .005 -.002 .001 -.009
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.012)
Continent -.068
(.009)
Continent-After .018 .019 .022 .016
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.012)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1047472 1047472 1047472 664637
R2 .002 .008 .025 .079
Notes: Dependent variable is one if the internal (school) grade is greater than the external (national
exam) grade, for each student in each exam in each year. Dummy After is one for 2007 and 2008 only.
Data used: 2002 to 2008, except for 2006. Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken
in each school in each year. Robust standard errors, allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance
levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
26Table 7: Eects on internal grades - Private schools control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After .026 .032 .019 .027
(.005) (.006) (.005) (.005)
Public -.034 -.034
(.010) (.010)
Public-After -.022 -.025 -.019 -.017
(.005) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1120030 1120030 1120030 713828
R2 .005 .01 .038 .071
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the school-level grade of each student in each exam in each year.
Dummy After is one for 2007 and 2008 only. Data used: 2002 to 2008, except for 2006. Columns 2-4
includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust standard errors,
allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
27Table 8: Eects on external grades - Private schools control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After .052 .066 .031 .074
(.012) (.014) (.010) (.011)
Public -.028 -.012
(.017) (.019)
Public-After -.058 -.065 -.048 -.046
(.012) (.015) (.011) (.012)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1119430 1119430 1119430 713376
R2 .001 .013 .05 .125
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the national exam grade of each student in each exam in each
year. Dummy After is one for 2007 and 2008 only. Data used: 2002 to 2008, except for 2006. Columns
2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust standard errors,
allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
28Table 9: Eects on grade in
ation - Private schools control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After -.067 -.125 .035 -.214
(.098) (.099) (.086) (.088)
Public -.166 -.285
(.130) (.147)
Public-After .248 .270 .193 .227
(.102) (.108) (.091) (.093)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1120030 1120030 1120030 713828
R2 .0007 .014 .054 .159
Notes: Dependent variable is the dierence between the internal (school) grade and the external (national
exam) grade of each student in each exam in each year. Dummy After is one for 2007 and 2008 only. Data
used: 2002 to 2008, except for 2006. Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken in each
school in each year. Robust standard errors, allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels:
*: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
29Table 10: Eects on internal grades - Islands control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 -.008 -.002 -.004 -.0001
(.006) (.005) (.004) (.004)
2004 .0009 .007 .001 .013
(.008) (.010) (.007) (.007)
2005 -.002 .003 -.001 .005
(.008) (.010) (.008) (.007)
2006 .013 .011 .012 .019
(.005) (.006) (.005) (.006)
2007 .015 .021 .013 .031
(.005) (.005) (.004) (.006)
2008 .004 .012 .002 .023
(.007) (.008) (.007) (.009)
Continent .0004
(.006)
Continent-2003 .009 .005 .004 .002
(.006) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Continent-2004 -.0004 -.0004 -.002 -.007
(.008) (.009) (.007) (.007)
Continent-2005 .001 .0009 -.001 -.002
(.009) (.010) (.008) (.007)
Continent-2006 .0005 .003 -.0006 -.002
(.005) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Continent-2007 -.011 -.011 -.013 -.015
(.005) (.005) (.004) (.006)
Continent-2008 -.0009 -.003 -.003 -.009
(.007) (.008) (.007) (.009)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1253690 1253690 1253690 800521
R2 .0007 .004 .022 .053
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the school-level grade of each student in each exam in each year.
Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Columns 2-4
includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust standard errors,
allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
30Table 11: Eects on external grades - Islands control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 .005 .019 .003 -.040
(.021) (.018) (.022) (.023)
2004 -.058 -.033 -.076 -.071
(.020) (.019) (.025) (.029)
2005 -.007 .011 -.018 -.033
(.018) (.017) (.022) (.028)
2006 -.059 -.063 -.064 -.066
(.022) (.030) (.021) (.028)
2007 -.040 -.018 -.067 -.024
(.018) (.018) (.020) (.024)
2008 .088 .117 .059 .116
(.020) (.022) (.023) (.028)
Continent .108
(.027)
Continent-2003 -.007 -.015 -.010 .010
(.021) (.018) (.023) (.024)
Continent-2004 .019 .015 .019 .025
(.020) (.019) (.025) (.030)
Continent-2005 .019 .016 .014 .024
(.018) (.017) (.022) (.028)
Continent-2006 .007 .014 .0009 -.0007
(.023) (.031) (.021) (.028)
Continent-2007 -.025 -.026 -.027 -.031
(.019) (.019) (.021) (.024)
Continent-2008 -.048 -.059 -.047 -.055
(.021) (.022) (.023) (.028)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1253044 1253044 1253044 800037
R2 .008 .02 .049 .141
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the national exam grade of each student in each exam in each
year. Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust
standard errors, allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
31Table 12: Eects on grade in
ation - Islands control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 -.078 -.145 -.011 .416
(.182) (.190) (.206) (.188)
2004 .483 .348 .654 .761
(.160) (.129) (.205) (.195)
2005 -.033 -.135 .072 .245
(.158) (.136) (.186) (.173)
2006 .737 .755 .774 .937
(.185) (.226) (.164) (.229)
2007 .610 .488 .810 .781
(.159) (.162) (.174) (.218)
2008 -.581 -.746 -.360 -.492
(.170) (.181) (.193) (.212)
Continent -.916
(.182)
Continent-2003 .168 .208 .133 -.026
(.184) (.192) (.206) (.190)
Continent-2004 -.078 -.056 -.119 -.216
(.163) (.129) (.199) (.193)
Continent-2005 -.124 -.105 -.115 -.207
(.162) (.137) (.183) (.173)
Continent-2006 -.003 -.040 .033 -.004
(.188) (.229) (.166) (.231)
Continent-2007 .119 .130 .112 .048
(.164) (.162) (.171) (.215)
Continent-2008 .368 .432 .335 .277
(.174) (.183) (.188) (.208)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1253690 1253690 1253690 800521
R2 .017 .031 .062 .19
Notes: Dependent variable is the dierence between the internal (school) grade and the external (national
exam) grade of each student in each exam in each year. Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number
of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust standard errors, allowing for clustering at the school
level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
32Table 13: Eects on internal grades - Private schools control group - Year decom-
position
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 .006 .006 .005 .006
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
2004 .011 .011 .002 .004
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
2005 .010 .009 .004 .006
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
2006 .028 .028 .020 .024
(.005) (.006) (.004) (.005)
2007 .036 .036 .019 .031
(.007) (.007) (.005) (.006)
2008 .040 .040 .023 .032
(.008) (.008) (.006) (.007)
Public -.034 -.031
(.010) (.009)
Public-2003 -.004 -.003 -.005 -.005
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.005)
Public-2004 -.004 -.004 -.005 -.0005
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Public-2005 -.005 -.005 -.008 -.004
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.006)
Public-2006 -.013 -.014 -.009 -.007
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Public-2007 -.025 -.026 -.021 -.018
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.007)
Public-2008 -.030 -.031 -.026 -.020
(.008) (.008) (.007) (.008)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1339542 1339542 1339542 859143
R2 .008 .01 .037 .072
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the school-level grade of each student in each exam in each year.
Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Columns 2-4
includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust standard errors,
allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
33Table 14: Eects on external grades - Private schools control group - Year decom-
position
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 .009 .009 .014 -.009
(.012) (.012) (.010) (.012)
2004 .001 -.002 -.025 -.010
(.016) (.016) (.012) (.018)
2005 .053 .051 .036 .039
(.014) (.014) (.012) (.015)
2006 -.017 -.019 -.040 -.041
(.016) (.016) (.012) (.014)
2007 .026 .019 -.034 .004
(.019) (.018) (.012) (.014)
2008 .141 .135 .084 .134
(.020) (.019) (.013) (.014)
Public -.024 -.0007
(.021) (.020)
Public-2003 -.005 -.006 -.021 -.023
(.013) (.012) (.010) (.013)
Public-2004 -.020 -.020 -.035 -.040
(.016) (.016) (.013) (.018)
Public-2005 -.026 -.026 -.042 -.051
(.015) (.014) (.013) (.016)
Public-2006 -.031 -.031 -.024 -.026
(.017) (.016) (.013) (.015)
Public-2007 -.070 -.070 -.062 -.062
(.020) (.019) (.013) (.015)
Public-2008 -.081 -.082 -.075 -.075
(.021) (.020) (.014) (.015)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1338860 1338860 1338860 858631
R2 .01 .018 .053 .142
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the national exam grade of each student in each exam in each
year. Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust
standard errors, allowing for clustering at the school level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
34Table 15: Eects on grade in
ation - Private schools control group - Year decom-
position
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 .028 .023 -.028 .243
(.104) (.100) (.083) (.099)
2004 .203 .222 .317 .237
(.102) (.099) (.084) (.130)
2005 -.372 -.362 -.294 -.335
(.110) (.109) (.100) (.124)
2006 .639 .657 .742 .823
(.115) (.112) (.110) (.138)
2007 .356 .411 .679 .541
(.131) (.126) (.109) (.129)
2008 -.713 -.668 -.420 -.712
(.134) (.129) (.111) (.121)
Public -.196 -.354
(.152) (.135)
Public-2003 .037 .051 .151 .144
(.105) (.102) (.088) (.105)
Public-2004 .106 .111 .224 .302
(.102) (.099) (.088) (.136)
Public-2005 .143 .152 .256 .368
(.114) (.112) (.106) (.129)
Public-2006 .076 .066 .066 .108
(.120) (.117) (.116) (.145)
Public-2007 .269 .254 .249 .280
(.137) (.130) (.113) (.133)
Public-2008 .402 .398 .401 .489
(.143) (.137) (.115) (.125)
Region xed eects X
School xed eects X
School-exam xed eects X
Obs. 1339542 1339542 1339542 859143
R2 .015 .026 .063 .187
Notes: Dependent variable is the dierence between the internal (school) grade and the external (national
exam) grade of each student in each exam in each year. Columns 2-4 includes a control for the number
of exams taken in each school in each year. Robust standard errors, allowing for clustering at the school
level. Signicance levels: *: 0.05; **: 0.01; ***: 0.001.
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